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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In “The incompleteness problem for a virtue-based theory of argumentation,” Brian 
MacPherson (2013) argues (as you might be able to guess from his title) that virtue-
based theories of argumentation suffer from an incompleteness problem. He is right 
about this. He suggests that the best solution is to supplement such theories with 
pragmatic-utilitarianism. This is a prudent (one might almost say, utility 
maximizing) suggestion. So, as a commentator I am left with little to say—other 
than, “Yes, you pretty much nailed it”! What I will do is say a few things about how 
we might understand a pragmatic-utilitarian approach to the issues raised in the 
paper. 
 
2. INCOMPLETENESS AND VIRTUE-BASED ARGUMENTATION 
 
The question of whether virtue theories of morals (such at those advanced by 
Aristotle, Aquinas, MacIntyre, Sen, and Nussbaum (1988)) are necessarily 
incomplete and therefore in need of external supplementation is a huge issue. Even 
if they do suffer from this problem, it does not follow that, with respect to a 
particular area (such as argumentation theory), such a theory will be incomplete 
and in need of external supplementation. One cannot know just from the fact (if it is 
one) that virtue theories suffer from an incompleteness problem that such theories 
are incomplete in all areas. Indeed, many incomplete theories are perfectly 
complete—in the sense of being able to handle all relevant cases that might arise in 
the relevant area—for certain sub-areas. Happily, MacPherson recognizes this fact 
and responds in the appropriate manner, viz., by showing that, within 
argumentation, a virtue-based theory of argumentation is incomplete. He does this 
by means of some compelling examples which counter one’s initial intuition that 
conflicts between argumentative virtues can be handled on an ad hoc case-by-case 
basis. (An interesting question, which MacPherson appropriately does not raise 
because it would take him too far afield, is this: Suppose we could deal with all cases 
of conflicts between argumentative virtues in a way that we found intuitively 
satisfying—say it felt as though, upon close examination, one virtue always 
outweighed the competing virtues whenever they gave conflicting advice—but we 
were unable to specify why we were able to do this.  Would this be cause for us to 
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think that virtue theory had an incompleteness problem or just that our theory of 
argumentative virtues was (thus far) incomplete?) 
 Since I agree with MacPherson that the virtue theory of argumentation is 
incomplete and because I find his example showing this compelling, I leave this 
issue aside and turn to MacPherson’s way of supplementing virtue theories of 
argumentation. 
 
3. UNDERSTANDING “PRAGMATIC-UTILITARIAN” GROUNDINGS 
 
MacPherson (2013) tells us this:  
 
A virtue-pragmatic-utilitarian-based theory of argumentation espouses 
argumentative virtues based on pragmatic-utilitarian grounds. Such an approach 
provides a motive for being a virtuous arguer, provided that it can be shown 
empirically that virtuous arguers generally fare better in terms of achieving their 
goals than non-virtuous arguers, and that a community of virtuous arguers is 
somehow better off (happier overall, achieves more of its goals) than a community 
of non-virtuous arguers.” (MacPherson, emphasis added) 
 
I take it from this that the pragmatic-utilitarian theory is supposed to supply two 
things: a motive for being a virtuous arguer, and a means of sorting out what to do 
when virtues compete and we cannot tell from inside the virtue theory itself which 
of the virtues to follow or how to balance them. 
 I note that these are two separate tasks. It is at least in principle possible that 
we have one mechanism for dealing with “hard cases” within a theory and a second 
account of why we should be motivated to adopt the theory (and the mechanism for 
dealing with hard cases). MacPherson just assumes that the same mechanism is 
appropriate for both tasks. This issue leads to the next problem. 
 In the second sentence quoted above, MacPherson lists two things that 
virtue-based argumentation theory is to turn to for motivating us to be virtuous 
arguers. First, it may be that being a virtuous arguer makes the arguer more likely to 
achieve her goals than she would be were she not a virtuous arguer. This is a 
rational choice contractarian defence of being or becoming a virtuous arguer. 
Presumably, were one to develop such an argument it would follow along the lines 
started by David Gauthier (1986) in his Morals by Agreement, where he shows that 
individuals who adopt the standard instrumental conception of rationality would 
have reason to actually change their conception of rationality when they find 
themselves interacting with others in the Humean circumstances of justice. Others 
have supplemented Gauthier’s work, but, so far as I know, no one has taken on the 
task of showing that rational choice contractarians have reason to become virtue-
based arguers.  
The second consideration that MacPherson mentions is that a community of 
virtuous arguers may be better off than a community of arguers who lack 
argumentative virtues. This is not a rational choice consideration but a utilitarian 
one. That is to say, it holds that the sum of the welfare of the members of a 
community of virtuous arguers is going to be greater than that of alternative 
communities. Although this is an extremely difficult matter to evaluate, it is in the 
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end an empirical one. Let us suppose that, for most communities of humans, it is the 
case that, at least insofar as they are engaged in argumentation, it will maximize 
their collective welfare if both: (a) they are virtuous arguers rather than non-
virtuous ones and (b) when dealing with conflicts of argumentative virtues, they use 
a community-wide utilitarian calculus to determine which virtue should take 
precedence.  
Now, in theory, these two accounts are competitors. In moral and political 
theory, they are thought to yield rather different outcomes. On this matter, I hold a 
minority view: that they almost always yield the same outcomes (Wein, 2005). That 
is to say, I hold that, for almost all circumstances humans are likely to encounter, the 
two theories will recommend the adoption of the same set of social practices.1 And, I 
am now—having read MacPherson—inclined to think that both theories will yield 
the same attitudes towards argumentative virtues. But, suppose I am wrong (and 
that the majority of experts in the area are right) and rational choice 
contractarianism and utilitarianism endorse different social arrangements in a wide 
variety of the sorts of circumstances in which humans regularly find themselves.  
And, in particular, suppose they yield different answers to the questions of when we 
should be virtuous arguers, how we should deal with conflicts between 
argumentative virtues, and why we should be moved to be or become virtuous 
arguers. That is to say, suppose that each of the two theories yields a different 
answer to each of these three questions, such that we end up with six answers, each 
pair of which has serious compatibility problems. 
Put another way, MacPherson’s first claim is that arguers, taken severally, 
will be better off if they are virtuous arguers. The second claim is that these arguers, 
taken collectively, will be better off if they are virtuous arguers. He joins these two 
claims with “and”, suggesting that he thinks that both must be true in order for the 
pragmatic-utilitarian considerations to successfully ground the claim that we should 
be or become virtuous arguers. But perhaps he should adopt one or the other (or 
some combination of the two). Indeed, I am inclined to think (and here I agree with 
the majority) that rational choice contractarianism yields a very plausible answer to 
why I (qua individual) should become a virtuous arguer. It is in my interest to 
change my straightforward conception of good argumentation (from, say, whatever 
is most convincing) to a constrained conception of argumentation (only accept 
virtuous arguments). And, as sophisticated discussions of utilitarianism (such as 
Peter Railton’s (1988)) show, utilitarianism can be understood in a way that is 
compatible with and nicely supplements virtue theories in just the ways that 
MacPherson thinks they need supplementation. So, perhaps he should pick and 
choose. Indeed, my intuitions are that a rational choice contractarian might well 
choose to become the sort of virtuous arguer who leaves hard cases of conflict 
between virtues to be decided in a utilitarian way.  But some work would need to be 
done to show this. 
 
                                                        
1 By “social practices” I mean to include the basic structure for society, moral belief, religious 
practices (if any), political arrangements, legal system and laws, economic policies, traditions, 
manners, and rules of etiquette. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
Brian MacPherson has, it seems to me, offered us an excellent account showing that 
and why virtue-base argumentation theories need supplementation, and he has, in 
my view, directed us to the right sort of supplementation to overcome this problem. 
But some may see problems with the supplementation he offers, and so his next task 
should be to clarify the nature and role of the pragmatic-utilitarian supplementation 
he gestures towards. 
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